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Abstract. On the basis of the principle of non-premeditation of speech, we argue that the 
synchronicity of hearing shared by everybody present is incompatible with a division 
of time between a sender and a receiver of a message. Th e act of speech brings the 
participants together in a single moment of perception called a synchronous point. Both 
the act of speech and music do not appear through time; rather, speech and music 
create time. Th e present time of our casual experience always contains a part of radical 
novelty, probable a posteriori, yet never predicted. Despite our capacity to predict many 
things and repeat procedures, in the advent of a given moment, the present will always 
show its uniqueness. Th us, improvisation is based on two principles of uncertainty: the 
non-premeditated occurrence of speech and the non-predicted part of present time. 
Keywords: creativity, musical semiotics, non-premeditation of speech, semiotics of 
novelty, specious present, synchronous point
Improvisation is a practice. As such, it poses a semiotic question of a cultural and 
technical nature. Th e practice of improvisation covers a large variety of arts. We will 
focus on music, taking spoken language as a theoretical horizon, and start with a basic 
disposition of language use.
Improvised music and the principle 
of non-premeditation of speech
A spoken chain, or an improvised line, however long it may be, has a beginning and 
an end. Th is apparently banal observation is in reality not trivial because a remark able 
property is associated with each of the boundaries: initial and fi nal. Th e initial boundary, 
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on which we will concentrate here,1 is associated with the fact that, in common speech 
or improvised music, the chain of words or sounds is not premeditated by the speaker 
or the player. It arrives without his knowledge, without warning. Th us, in the act of 
speaking, the chain is not mentally constructed before it is uttered; the same holds for 
improvised music.
The non-premeditation of common speech is a basic principle in human 
semiotic behaviour and constitutes as such an unconscious foundation for all acts of 
improvisation. In other words, improvisation is rooted, beyond the realm of will, in 
an anthropological disposition. In a common dialogue, does the speaker choose his 
words before uttering them? Does he control the elements of the spoken chain and their 
relationships? Does he compose the chain before saying it out loud? Clearly, the answer is 
“no”. Th e chain is neither premeditated nor preassembled by the speaker. Put diff erently, 
we have to admit the simple fact that speech is not a deliberate construction, but escapes 
our control. If we pay close attention, we observe that sentences emerge spontaneously, 
in an impromptu fashion, without any voluntary or reasoned combinatorial work: 
sentences turn out to be assembled without having been consciously assembled. Th e 
elements of the uttered chain are not announced. Th ey come without our awareness. 
In other words, the act of speaking is not a construction, but is surging forth.
Th e principle of non-premeditation is a basic concept of language use.2 It consti tutes 
a powerful challenge to the common-sense conception of a subject who fi rst thinks and 
then expresses his ideas through well-chosen words. Th us, the act of speaking, which 
is the sign of individual freedom, power and knowledge, is oddly placed outside his 
conscious control. Th is may sound paradoxical. Let us look at a few cases.
Singing a song as opposed to telling a story. Singing a song, or reciting a poem, 
presupposes that words have been memorized whereas telling a story does not 
presuppose either texts or words in advance. Consequently, I can’t recite a poem or sing 
1 Th e second property applies to the end of any act of speech. It is associated with the fact 
that the chain of signs is not conserved in memory by the participants of the dialogue. Indeed, 
just a few exchanges suffi  ce for the participants to have totally forgotten the precise terms of 
the preceding chain and its form. Th us in a dialogue, the chain of words appears in order to 
eventually disappear. A simple experiment will make this clear: the fact that I have followed a 
conversation closely does not presuppose that I have learned it by heart. Not that I could not 
have memorized it, but in everyday practice memorization is not useful. Th e same holds true 
when one is listening to an improvised music piece for the fi rst time. Th is property of non-
conservation of sentences or musical lines shows that the memory principle of language and 
improvised music does not operate based on conservation. (See also Coursil 2000, 2015.)
2 “[… or,] de tous les actes que l’on pourrait mettre en parallèle, l’acte linguistique, si je puis le 
nommer ainsi, [a ce caractère d’être] le moins réfl échi, le moins prémédité, en même temps que 
le plus impersonnel de tous” – “[…] among all acts comparable, the linguistic act, if I can call 
it this way, has the characteristic of being the least preconceived, the least premeditated, and at 
the same time, the most impersonal of all” (Saussure, ELG: 150; my translation, J. C.).  
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a song if I don’t know the words or the lyrics. But this limitation does not apply to telling 
a story. It is awkward to say (although the sentence is syntactically and semantically 
correct) – Sorry, I can’t tell this story because I don’t know the words. In everyday 
speech of this sort, words are not premeditated. Consequently, the following request 
is a contradictio in adjecto: Please tell me the story but don’t leave out a single word. A 
story to be told is not attached to any particular words or chains of words. For a known 
story, there is an infi nity of possible narratives. Because of this lexical and syntactic 
unpreparedness of speech, the speaker is de facto a creator. When characterizing 
common speech, Herder wrote the famous and obscure sentence, “To speak is to make 
poetry”. Th is everyday poetics is not an art but a basic and compulsory disposition of 
language use. In the social protocol of common dialogue, the premeditation of speech 
is forbidden: to recite is not accepted as a form of talking, as common speech has to 
be creative and new as a basic feature. Th is also holds for (truly) improvised music.
Witticism. Let us take witticism as an example of language creativity. Insults burst 
out and have their intended eff ect when they are new and appropriate. Of course, 
it is possible to have a catalogue of ready-made insults in reserve, but the diffi  culty 
of selecting the right one at the right moment might ruin the maneuver. In order 
to insult someone with a witticism, we must be alert and eloquent. Eloquence is an 
artistic state, which confi rms, if confi rmation is needed, that one can be aware of the 
lack of premeditation, but cannot be exempted from it. Like any good improvisation, 
a witticism worthy of its name must be spontaneous, original and timely, for preparing 
a witticism ahead of time in order to bring it out at the right moment contradicts the 
principle of witticism itself.
In the light of statistical observations, we may conclude that spoken language is 
astonishingly repetitive and habit-driven, strongly ritualized and full of formulaic 
expressions. In short, creativity in language is so rare that it cannot be a linguistic principle. 
In the same vein, one can ask whether there is, among all the clichés, such a thing as an 
improvised piece of music? Yet these quantitative observations leave the principle of non-
premeditation intact, as can easily be shown. For instance, we know why it is so diffi  cult 
to speak in public without preparation, so hard to say what needs to be said using the 
right words. In this familiar exercise of eloquence, the speaker notices that language is 
not a docile instrument of expression, but an unpredictable and reluctant reality.
Unquestionably, before we begin to talk, it is good to know what we are talking 
about; but the exact arrangement of the words stays beyond our control. In other 
words, the property of non-premeditation precludes associating the speaker with a 
prior, constructive and conscious lexical, syntactic or stylistic intention. Th e words in 
a sentence or the notes in an improvised melody are not chosen one aft er another by 
the subject. In fact, no conscious agency controls the advent of the spoken or musical 
chain in the form it fi nally takes.
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Synchronous point
Th e participants of a dialogue hear the chain being produced at the same time, including 
the speaker, since he/she has no prior knowledge of it. Th e participants catch the chain’s 
advent simultaneously and not one aft er another. Th is is the reason why the following 
dialogical situations are awkward: She heard Paul aft er he spoke or Paul said it before 
she heard it or She heard what Paul said before Alfred did. Th e speech imposes itself 
to everyone present simultaneously. Th us from the simplest utterance to the subtlest 
witticism, the act of speech unites the participants in a single moment of pragmatic 
perception called a synchronous point.
In a dialogue, none of the participants, not even the speaker, has a prior knowledge 
of the linguistic elements coming up. Here again, the spoken chain, like the improvised 
melodic line, only comes into existence when put into action: before its advent, it has 
no ontological status.
Th is synchronicity of hearing shared by everybody present is incompatible 
with a division of time between a sender and a receiver of a message as suggested 
metaphorically by the classic schema of communication. Th is linear representation 
induces an illusory lapse of time between emission of the utterance (encoding) and 
its reception (decoding), which has no pragmatic reality. Th e factual status of the 
synchronous point deconstructs this widely spread imaginary representation.
In improvised music, in like fashion, the performer and the audience hear the 
sounds at the same time. Unless he/she plays clichés, he/she does not have any head 
start regarding forms, notes or timbres, even if the tonalities and the modulations are 
given in advance. In other words, the performer is also, without a doubt, a listener. Th e 
synchronous point constitutes a primary feature of socialization, as it brings together 
all the participants in a single "intuition of the instant”, as Bachelard (1932) wrote for 
the title of one of his books on time.
Th e analogy between improvisation and linguistic theory is not simply formal since 
language use is a constitutive feature of any human expression. 
The art of improvisation
Th e art of improvising is rooted in a characteristic property of natural language use. 
However, though necessary, non-premeditation is not a suffi  cient criterion for defi ning 
improvisation. Let us take a couple of examples to highlight the diff erence of scope 
between non-premeditation and improvisation: Please, tell us a story – as opposed 
to – Please improvise (invent on the spot) a story. Indeed, improvising a story takes 
more than the unpremeditated fl ow of signifi cant signs that characterizes storytelling; 
it is an art. In fact, anybody can recite a poem or sing a song, but to improvise a poem 
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or a song presupposes a substantial practice. Th e following examples correspond to 
these two diff erent requests: Recite a poem – as opposed to – improvise a poem; Sing a 
song – as opposed to – improvise a song. For improvisation, art is required.
In music, there is a strong diff erence between an improvisation and a performance. 
First, in the act of improvisation, there is in principle nothing to be performed (pre-
written, preconceived and rehearsed forms); in improvisation, the player is somehow 
overrun by his own playing whereas performance implies full control of the forms, 
either through reading or memorization of a score. Second, improvisation cannot be 
reduced to the display of instrumental virtuosity and agility. We should also keep in 
mind that expressionism would be a misleading question in improvisation because it 
supposes the old myth of interiority; i.e., a-deep-inside-in-my-heart expressed to an 
outside world.3
As a professional practice, improvisation is obviously a premeditated action but, 
curiously enough, its form and content are not. Th us we will say that it is a premeditated 
act of non-premeditation, or in other words, an ago-antagonistic disposition.
Improvisation and systems of musical values
It is impossible to generalize any further on improvisation. Th e concept varies with 
the intonation tables specifi c to particular cultures. Moreover, modal, tonal, atonal or 
free forms of improvisation are distinct practices. Improvising melody lines or songs 
is to be distinguished from improvising on the basis of harmonic changes, which is 
diff erent from improvising recitative forms, where the player in modal music takes 
the position of the storyteller, and so forth. Th is holds for improvisation of timbres in 
contemporary improvised music.
Music is not an art of approximation, even regarding the most open forms.4 Techni-
cally speaking, improvisers deal with intervals (minimally: octave, fi ft h, fourth...). Th ey 
do not manipulate units (notes), but intervals, which are diff erential values. Th en 
in tonal or modal music, improvised sequences of intervals emerge from a domain 
of expected values. Th ey are supposed to be original paths of intervals formed in a 
predefi ned and shared structure.
Each social being has interiorized semiotic systems, which are constitutive of all 
cultures: music, language, natural integers, etc. We hear music through a pre-acquired 
system of harmonic and rhythmic values. In a similar fashion, we understand speech 
because we have interiorized a grammar.
3  See Wittgenstein 1953.
4  Music in all of its forms, even without wanting, always falls under the law of numbers.
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Although language and improvised music share fundamental principles, they are 
nevertheless two autonomous systems. For example, as opposed to language, music 
is a system of values without signs. We also need to consider that an act of speech, as 
opposed to music, is necessarily a solo act (usually, in a dialogue only one participant 
speaks at a time). Music builds simultaneities of voices, but speech is always an act for 
a single person; unisons and choirs belong to ritual and to theatrical practices only. 
Th e simultaneity of singing voices leads to harmony, but the simultaneity of talking 
voices leads to linguistic disaster.
 
Improvisation as time value – Musikalische Momente
Instances of improvisation are both event and trace, or, as Schubert put it, Musikalische 
Momente (musical moments).5 A moment of improvised music is a time value in our 
live. Th e understanding of improvisation as time value, as presence, rather than as a 
purely aesthetic form, puts our common-sense representation of time into question.
In Western cultures, the standard representation of time is linear. Time is conceived 
of as a horizontally oriented vector separating past and future by an immaterial point, 
the present. Th is familiar image of a time line is a strong cultural standard and has 
resisted all sorts of criticisms, scientifi c or philosophical, recent or ancient. Under such 
a linear conception, the so-called fl uidity or “viscosity” of time, as Bachelard (1932) 
called it, does not allow any room for the present, for it disappears in the very moment 
of its apparition. Th e present, having no measurable length on this representation, has 
no duration either. Consequently, between the past and the future, there is no time 
left  for the present time.
In order to question this commonplace linear conception, which is incompatible 
with the understanding of improvisation as time value, let us consider the observation 
that it is, indeed, now that I am thinking of yesterday, of tomorrow, next year or of 
the past centuries. Events are past or future only in the present as acts of thought. 
Yesterday and tomorrow occur today. Only present time allows my conceiving of past 
and future. In this perspective, the present is no longer a furtive point on a line but a 
subjective experience during which past and future are maintained or transformed. 
Th is anamnesis supposes a duration.6 Th en, contradicting common sense, we will say 
that past and future, as they suppose an act of thought, always happen in present 
time.
5  Musikalische Momente, six last piano sonatas by Franz Schubert. 
6  Cf. Ricoeur 1963; Husserl 1991. 
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Th e advent of the present coincides with the deconstruction of a previous present. 
It is an event, “un événement rupture,” according to Foucault (1966) which triggers the 
advent of a new value disposition, a new situation.
Music and speech happen in this sort of time, which proceeds by sequences of 
transformations; as such, it is a necessary feature of improvisation. But, as acts of 
speech, music does not appear through time; rather, music creates time. In other words, 
temporality is not a given framework for speech or for music: time has to happen, and 
speech and music make it happen.
Improvisation and the novelty of the present
Th e present in our common experience always contains a part of radical novelty, a 
genuinely new part that could not have been declared beforehand in a future tense.7 
We can predict many things, we can repeat procedures, but the present will always 
happen in its uniqueness.
Th e mix of a predictable order with an intrinsic novelty of time characterizes the 
present as an unstable space. What is happening now contains a part that has never 
been previously declared in the future tense in any past discourse. In other words, this 
part of present time was neither predicted nor declared. It would be hard to conceive 
of a moment in social life that had been entirely described in a statement in future 
tense before it happens. We might have to change our habit of thinking in linear terms, 
implying the idea that the future comes aft er the present, as yesterday’s future can be 
today’s past.
Conclusion
Musikalische Momente, moments of improvised music, are thus based on two prin ciples 
of uncertainty: the non-premeditated occurrence of speech and the non-predicted 
part of present time. It is in this unstable structure that the subject thinks, speaks and 
improvises.
Improvisation falls clearly within the realm of the unconscious. Th is space of music 
values is silent in memory and the improvised line is non-premeditated. Clearly, one can 
learn choruses of Charlie Parker by heart and transcribe them on paper, as musicians 
do, and as I did, but when it comes to improvisation, this does not give you the slightest 
clue or hint; in improvisation, one has to invent an event, that is to say, create the advent 
of a present. Th is is what is meant by improvisation as time value.
7  Cf. Duhem 2003. 
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An improviser is a musician who has opted for the fi eld of non-premeditation of 
events. Th e more improvisation gets away from this characteristic, as in ritualized 
practices or playing clichés, the less it justifi es its name.8
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Скрытые основы импровизации
Лежащий в основе нашей статьи принцип неподготовленности речи утверждает, что 
синхронность слушания участников речевого акта несовместима с делимостью вре-
мени между отправителем и получателем. Речевой акт собирает участников в одном 
и том же моменте перцепции, которую мы называем точка синхронии.  Как речевой 
акт, так и музыка появляются не во времени, а скорее сами создают время. Настоящее 
повседневного опыта содержит всегда часть радикального новшества, возможное a 
posteriori, которое никогда не предсказывалось. Несмотря на свою способность многое 
предсказывать и повторять, настоящее в момент своего наступления всегда показывает 
свою уникальность. Таким образом, импровизация основывается на двух принципах 
неопределенности: неподготовленность речи и непредсказуемая часть настоящего.
Improvisatsiooni varjatud alused
Kõne ettevalmistamatuse printsiip, millest lähtume, võimaldab väita, et kõnes osalejate kuul mise 
sünkroonsus on kokkusobimatu teate saatja ja vastuvõtja vahelise aja jagatavusega. Kõne akt 
toob osalejad kokku samal tajumomendil, mida nimetame sünkroonseks punktiks. Nii kõneakt 
kui ka muusika mitte ei ilmu aja kaudu, vaid pigem loovad aja. Igapäevase koge muse olevik 
8 An earlier version of this essay has been published in: Zorn, John (ed.) 2008. Arcana III: 
Musicians on Music. New York: Hips Road, 58–65.
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sisaldab alati osalt radikaalset uudsust, võimalikku a posteriori, mida ometi pole kunagi ette 
ennustatud. Vaatamata meie võimele paljut ennustada ja korrata, näitab olevik antud momendi 
saabumisel alati oma unikaalsust. Seega põhineb improvisatsioon kahel määra matuse printsiibil: 
kõne ettevalmistamatusel ja oleviku ennustamatul osal. 
